Every architectural decision made with a compliance officer's requirements as the constraint.
How we protect your users' data
User's Device
TLS 1.3
Document images deleted after 30 days. A derived face template is retained with the record.
Solidus API Edge
BLAKE3 hash
Validatorsconsensus
BLS signature
Solidus Blockchaincredential hash anchored
User's DID Walletcredential stored by user
Privacy by architecture
Biometric data handling
A face template is derived from your document photo and stored with the verification record. Document and selfie images are deleted after 30 days, session recordings after 365, by a purge that runs in production.
Data Minimization
Only cryptographic proofs are stored on-chain — never names, passport numbers, or photos.
User-Controlled Credentials
Credentials live in the user's DID wallet. You cannot access them without the user's consent.
Erasure and retention
Verify has no end-user accounts, so there is nothing here for a data subject to delete themselves. An operator can erase everything this organization holds about one subject through an audited endpoint, and the receipt states what could not be removed. Erasure is partial where anti-money-laundering evidence is append-only and legally retained. Document images are held 30 days and recordings 365, then deleted by an automated daily job. The on-chain hash cannot be reversed to PII. Subjects who hold a Solidus identity account can remove that account themselves from its settings.
Consent, Honestly
There is no signed consent transaction. A per-organisation consent toggle exists in the dashboard, but no backend code reads it, so obtaining and recording consent is currently your responsibility.
Open Source
All credential issuance logic is open-source and independently auditable.
Regulatory compliance, mapped
Requirement
Solidus Implementation
Article 5(1)(e) — Storage limitation
A face embedding is derived from the document photo and written to the verification record. The verification result is stored as a BLAKE3 hash. Source images are kept 30 days and recordings 365, then deleted by an automated daily purge; the embedding is not covered by that purge.
Article 17 — Right to erasure
Partially implemented. Retention windows expire on a fixed schedule and a daily job deletes the data; the on-chain hash is one-way and cannot be reversed to recover PII. An operator-actioned erasure endpoint now removes what this organization holds about a subject and returns a receipt naming what it could not remove, because anti-money-laundering records are append-only. Verify has no end-user accounts; a subject with a Solidus identity account can remove that account themselves.
Article 25 — Privacy by design
No personal data is stored on the Solidus protocol layer. That is an architectural property, not an assessed compliance position: no independent assessment has been performed.
Article 32 — Security of processing
TLS 1.3 in transit. BLAKE3 hashing for verification results. BLS signatures for validator consensus.
Requirement
Solidus Implementation
Article 68 — KYC for VASP operators
KYC Level 2 produces the identity-proofing input a crypto-asset service provider needs for the identification leg. Whether that satisfies Article 68 is the relying party’s assessment, and the rest of what MiCA requires is not built.
FATF Travel Rule (via MiCA)
Not built. Mapping credential metadata onto the concepts of originator and beneficiary is not IVMS 101, and adjacency to a capability is not the capability.
Requirement
Solidus Implementation
EU Digital Identity Wallet (EUDIW) compatibility
We issue SD-JWT VC, one of the two credential formats the EU framework accepts. Sharing a format is not being part of the framework, and no format claim implies recognition.
Electronic Attestation of Attributes (EAA)
Not held. Electronic Attestation of Attributes has a legal meaning under eIDAS 2 that requires qualified trust service provider status, which we do not hold in any Member State.
Requirement
Solidus Implementation
VASP originator/beneficiary identification
Not built. No Travel Rule implementation and no IVMS 101 message construction, parsing or transmission exists in the codebase.
Counterparty VASP lookup
Not built. Counterparty discovery is an unsolved industry problem and we have not implemented any part of it.
Requirement
Solidus Implementation
Written informed consent (740 ILCS 14/15(b))
Not built. There is no consent transaction, on-chain or otherwise. The dashboard exposes a "require consent" toggle that no backend code reads, so the written-consent duty rests entirely with you.
Biometric data retention prohibition
A facial template IS written to storage: the face embedding is persisted on the verification record. It is not covered by the image retention purge. No independent assessment of BIPA compliance has been performed.
Destruction schedule
A biometric template is retained and no destruction schedule currently applies to it — the purge deletes images and recordings, not the derived embedding. Whether that meets §15(e) is a legal assessment nobody has performed for us.
Responsible Disclosure
We take security seriously. If you discover a vulnerability in Solidus Verify, report it responsibly. We commit to acknowledging reports within 24 hours and resolving critical issues within 7 days. We will not pursue legal action against good-faith security researchers.